Kevin Thomas v. Deborah Shaw by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-2-2015 
Kevin Thomas v. Deborah Shaw 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Kevin Thomas v. Deborah Shaw" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 1239. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/1239 
This December is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 1 
 
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
__________ 
 
Nos. 14-4259, 14-4370, 14-4371, and 14-4372 
__________ 
  
KEVIN A. THOMAS, 
    Appellant in 14-4259 
 
v. 
 
DEBORAH SHAW, ESQ.;  
NORMAN BARILLA, ESQ.;  
JOHN DICOLA, JR.;  
DOLORES DICOLA; 
HOLLY LYN THOMAS 
 
      Holly Lyn Thomas, Appellant in 14-4370 
         Delores Dicola, Appellant in 14-4371 
          John Dicola, Jr., Appellant in 14-4372 
 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-01344) 
 
District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 8, 2015 
 
BEFORE: FUENTES, SMITH, and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 2, 2015) 
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____________________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 Plaintiff, Kevin Thomas, brought this action against his ex-wife, Holly Thomas, 
her parents, John DiCola, Jr. and Dolores DiCola (collectively the “DiColas”), and their 
attorneys, Norman Barilla and Deborah Shaw.  Thomas claims that Defendants conspired 
to deprive him of his constitutional due process rights during the course of state custody 
proceedings related to his son.  He further alleges that Defendants conspired to violate his 
constitutional rights and that, as a result of their actions, he suffered from intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.1   
 Defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts of the complaint.2  
Additionally, the DiColas and Holly Thomas each filed motions for sanctions under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 11.  The District Court granted the motions for summary judgment, finding that 
Plaintiff failed to present any evidence to support his claims.  The court, however, denied 
the motion for Rule 11 sanctions.  On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the District Court 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
2 Shaw did not move for summary judgment, as the District Court granted Shaw’s motion 
to dismiss.  In consequence, Shaw is not a party to this appeal.   
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erred because it resolved factual issues against him which should have been left to a jury.   
Defendants argue that the District Court properly entered judgment in their favor because 
Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence in support of his claims.  The DiColas and 
Holly Thomas separately contend that the District Court improperly denied their motion 
for sanctions under Rule 11 because, they argue, Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous and 
vexatious. 
 For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.  
I. 
 Plaintiff and his ex-wife, Holly Thomas, are the divorced parents of a minor child.  
The DiColas are Holly Thomas’s parents.  Barilla, an attorney practicing in Lawrence 
County, Pennsylvania, is a high school classmate and friend of John DiCola, Jr.  Shaw, 
also an attorney, is Barilla’s former legal partner.  Judge John Hodge is a judge presiding 
on the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas.  For a number of years, Plaintiff and 
Holly Thomas have been embroiled in a custody dispute concerning their son.3  
 In 2004, custody proceedings regarding the Thomas’s minor son commenced in 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.  Thereafter, Holly Thomas moved to Lawrence County, 
Pennsylvania.  As a result of her move, her attorney petitioned to have the proceedings 
transferred to Lawrence County, where it was assigned to Judge Hodge.  Shaw, Barilla’s 
                                              
3 We note that, while Judge Hodge was originally a party to this lawsuit, the claims 
against him were eventually dismissed with prejudice on grounds of judicial immunity. 
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legal partner at the time, was eventually appointed Guardian Ad Litem (“G.A.L.”) for the 
Thomases’ child during the proceedings.4   
 During the custody proceedings, Plaintiff apparently became agitated with Judge 
Hodge’s handling of the case.  In particular, he criticized Judge Hodge’s initial decision 
to appoint Shaw as G.A.L.  He also claimed that Holly Thomas taunted him at one point 
about the fact that Judge Hodge was now presiding over the case.  Plaintiff eventually 
concluded that Defendants had conspired to have the case transferred to Lawrence 
County so that Judge Hodge could manipulate the proceedings in Holly Thomas’s favor.  
The day after he filed the instant action in U.S. District Court, Judge Hodge recused 
himself from the case. 
 In broad terms, Plaintiff claims that John DiCola, Jr. and Barilla supported Judge 
Hodge in his judicial election campaign and, after some bartering amongst the parties, 
Judge Hodge agreed to handle the custody proceedings in a manner that favored Holly 
Thomas.  The second amended complaint therefore paints DiCola as a pillar in local 
politics and a longtime friend of Judge Hodge.  Plaintiff claims that Judge Hodge’s 
reputation had been tainted by scandal and that, without DiCola’s political support, Judge 
Hodge would not have been elected to the bench.  He further claims that Judge Hodge 
explicitly agreed to help DiCola’s daughter, Holly Thomas, gain an advantage in custody 
proceedings.  Barilla, because of his relationship with both Judge Hodge and DiCola, also 
                                              
4 After Barilla began providing legal advice to Holly Thomas and the DiColas about a 
potential joint purchase of a bakery, Shaw withdrew as G.A.L. due to perceived conflicts 
of interest by Plaintiff and his attorney.   
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allegedly facilitated and bolstered this scheme. Defendants also allegedly met on several 
occasions to discuss how to aid Holly Thomas in the custody proceedings.   
 During discovery, Plaintiff testified that a local attorney and former assistant to 
Barilla, Luanne Parkenon (“Parkenon”), approached him at a social gathering and 
informed him that Barilla and Judge Hodge shared a long-time relationship.   He says 
that, at the time, Parkenon told him that Barilla probably supported Judge Hodge during 
his judicial election and that Judge Hodge had regularly visited Barilla’s office.  
Parkenon could not, however, provide any specific dates, times, or other details regarding 
the meetings.  Moreover, in a sworn affidavit, Parkenon also could not recall whether 
Judge Hodge or Barilla had any connection to DiCola.  She further explained that she had 
not worked for Barilla for over ten years before speaking to Plaintiff and therefore could 
not recall whether DiCola, Barilla, and Judge Hodge maintained a relationship or ever 
met with one another. 
 For their part, DiCola and Judge Hodge each denied that any of the interactions 
alleged by Plaintiff ever took place.  For a period of time, DiCola served as Township 
Supervisor and Director of Public Services in Neshannock Township in Lawrence 
County.  DiCola and Judge Hodge both denied ever consulting on any legal matters while 
DiCola was employed in that capacity.  They further denied taking any steps to 
manipulate the assignment of the custody proceedings.  Barilla acknowledged his 
relationship with DiCola and admitted that he knew Judge Hodge from their time 
working in adjacent buildings in a nearby town.  However, he also denied ever using his 
relationships with DiCola or Judge Hodge to affect the custody proceedings.  During his 
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own deposition, the only evidence that Plaintiff could identify to support his claims was 
that “as we moved through the case, from outset on down it became apparent the judge 
was disinterested in the case itself but, rather, in serving the interests of his long-time 
friend, John DiCola, and his long-time friend [sic] daughter, Holly.”5  Plaintiff could not 
provide any other factual detail to bolster his claim of a conspiracy. 
II.  
 In order to support a cause of action for a federal civil rights claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) he was deprived of a right, privilege, or 
immunity secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States; and (2) that the 
deprivation was caused by a person while acting under the color of state law.6     
 Moreover, as to establishing a conspiracy specifically involving a judge, “merely 
resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a 
co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge.”7  To succeed on his claims, a plaintiff 
must establish the existence of “an agreement between the state court judges and 
[d]efendants to rule in favor of [defendants].”8  Bare allegations that a conspiracy must 
                                              
5 (Joint App. at 671.)   
6 Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1965).  
  
7 See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980).   
 
8 Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 
2010) (citing Dennis, 449 U.S. at 28).   
 
 7 
 
have existed simply because of “concerted action of a kind not likely to occur in the 
absence of an agreement” are insufficient.9   
 Plaintiff’s principal argument is that a conspiracy existed between Defendants and 
Judge Hodge to deprive him of his constitutional due process rights.  However, as the 
District Court noted, there must be some specific facts which tend to show a meeting of 
the minds and some type of concerted activity.  A plaintiff cannot rely merely on 
subjective suspicions and unsupported speculation.  In granting summary judgment in 
favor of the Defendants, Chief Judge Conti also referred to Thomas’s “vague and 
conclusory allegations that a conspiracy must have existed simply because of how poorly 
he believe[d] that Judge Hodge handled his case.”10  We agree with that attribution.  
 Here, it is clear that Plaintiff’s claims could not survive summary judgment.  
There is an utter void in the evidence regarding Parkenon’s alleged statements or 
suggestions that any of the Defendants took part in a conspiracy to undermine the custody 
proceedings.  And, as noted below, Plaintiff relies solely on his own testimony and 
speculation to support his claims.  Yet, the only testimonial evidence provided by 
Plaintiff during his deposition was, put generously, underwhelming.  For instance, 
although Plaintiff’s theory rested largely upon his belief that DiCola and Judge Hodge 
had a political relationship, Plaintiff simply testified that it was “standard routine” for 
                                              
9 Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 178. 
10 Thomas v. Barilla, No. CIV.A. 2:11-1344, 2014 WL 4721755, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 
22, 2014). 
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DiCola to exchange “favors for favors” with political allies.11  Plaintiff offered no other 
viable documentary or testimonial evidence to support his claims.  
 In sum, we find that the District Court properly concluded that there was no 
evidence in the record to support Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim or conspiracy allegations 
against the Defendants.  The District Court therefore properly granted Defendants’ 
motions for summary judgment on these claims. 
III. 
 Following the District Court’s ruling on the merits, several of the Defendants also 
moved for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, which the Court denied.  The DiColas and 
Holly Thomas now separately appeal that ruling.  They argue that Plaintiff’s claims were 
patently false, frivolous, and asserted in flagrant bad faith.  In response, Plaintiff argues 
that the District Court properly denied Defendants’ motion for sanctions because 
Defendants failed to describe, with specificity, the alleged conduct that violated Rule 11. 
 We review a district court’s decision to impose sanctions for abuse of discretion.12  
Rule 11 provides in relevant part: “By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, 
or other paper . . . an attorney . . . certifies that to the best of [his] knowledge, 
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . 
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support, or, if specifically so identified, will 
likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or 
                                              
11 (Joint App. at 671-72.) 
12 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990); Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat’l 
Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1357 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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discovery . . . .”  Therefore, the meaning of the Rule is plain: A party who signs a 
pleading or other paper without first conducting a reasonable inquiry may be 
sanctioned.13  The test under Rule 11 is an objective test of reasonableness which is 
aimed at discouraging pleadings having no factual basis.14   
 While Plaintiff’s claims ultimately did not succeed, the District Court found that 
sanctions were not appropriate because Plaintiff’s claims were “not frivolous or 
abusive.”15  We, too, find that sanctions were not supported by the record, and thus the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendants’ motion under Rule 11.   
IV.  
 For substantially the same reasons set forth in the well-reasoned and thorough 
opinion of the District Court, we affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of the 
Defendants and the denial of Defendants’ motion for sanctions under Rule 11.16   
                                              
13 Ellis v. Beemiller, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 326, 338 (W.D. Pa. 2012). 
 
14 Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1278 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
15 (Joint App. at 24.) 
 
16 In light of the District Court’s conclusion that there was no evidence to support 
Plaintiff’s claim that there was a conspiracy which included his former spouse, her father 
and mother, her attorney, and the state court judge presiding over this case, and upon our 
extensive review of the record, we believe this case may warrant damages under Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.  Under that Rule, we require a separately filed motion 
and reasonable opportunity to respond.   
